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Abstract—Mobile phones have developed into complex plat-
forms with large numbers of installed applications and a
wide range of sensitive data. Application security policies limit
the permissions of each installed application. As applications
may interact, restricting single applications may create a false
sense of security for the end users while data may still leave
the mobile phone through other applications. Instead, the
information flow needs to be policed for the composite system of
applications in a transparent and usable manner. In this paper,
we propose to employ static analysis based on the software
architecture and focused data flow analysis to scalably detect
information flows between components. Specifically, we aim to
reveal transitivity of trust problems in multi-component mobile
platforms. We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach
with Android applications, although the generalization of the
analysis to similar composition-based architectures, such as
Service-oriented Architecture, can also be explored in the
future.
I. INTRODUCTION
Powerful and well-connected smartphones are becoming
increasingly common with the availability of affordable de-
vices and data plans. Increasingly, the smartphones’ features
are provided by focused applications that users can easily
install from application market places. On the other hand,
with tens of thousands of applications available, there is
only limited control over the quality and intent of those
applications. Mobile code and extensibility is one of the key
issues that increase the complexity of information security
[1]. To counter this threat, mobile operating systems impose
security restrictions for each application.
The Android mobile operating system is one of the major
systems on mobile phones. In case of the Android secu-
rity model, the least-privilege principle is enforced through
application-level permissions that can be requested by the
applications. End users need to grant the permissions at
install time and thereby decide on the adequacy of the re-
quired permissions and the trustworthiness of the individ-
ual application. The permission granting procedure places
a burden on the end users, who need to reason about how
the application might employ the permissions. In particular,
the end user has little knowledge about the consequences
regarding the transitivity of permission granting. As depicted
in Figure 1, a malicious application (1) with only local
permissions (2) may proxy sensitive data (3) through third
party applications and services (4) to external destinations
(5). We describe further attack scenarios in Section III-A.
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Figure 1. Example of malicious information flow
The inter-component cooperation is an important concept
on the Android platform, but the user needs to be able to
differentiate between legitimate and malicious information
flows.
The above-described issue of missing transparency poses
a risk with the spreading of smartphones, the large numbers
of available applications and the prevalent custom of in-
stalling applications from untrustworthy sources. The high
likelihood of the threat can be deduced from the wealth
of sensitive data that is stored on mobile phones, ranging
from online banking and business application credentials
to communication data and location information. On the
Android platform, the first attacks have already been con-
ducted through malicious online banking applications [2].
The threat is further increased by the number of data chan-
nels, such as the short message service, E-mail or Web
access that allow the flow of information out of the device
context. Moreover, attack scenarios are not limited to con-
fidentiality breaches. The integrity of the device may also
be endangered through similar attack vectors. For example,
permissions to use expensive services may be abused.
In this paper, we describe an approach to detecting il-
legitimate information flows between different applications
and out of the platform. This way, problems can be re-
vealed that are induced by interacting applications and per-
mission transitivity. We demonstrate the feasibility of our
approach with applications running on the Android platform,
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although other mobile platforms and application markets
(iPhone Store, Blackberry World, Windows Mobile Market)
are similarly threatened. The transitivity-of-trust problem is
not only restricted to mobile platforms. A similar threat can
be seen in other multi-component environments, such as
Social Networking applications and Service-oriented Archi-
tecture (SOA). In this sense, we see our work as a starting
point for research, namely, analyzing the consequences of
the extensibility of systems with respect to security and
mitigating possible risks induced by this paradigm.
Our approach to the information flow analysis spanning
multiple applications is as follows. The information on data
sources such as location services, databases, or contact lists
are combined with information on the data sinks (outgoing
channels). These input data are used in a two-layer infor-
mation flow analysis: First, we identify Android components
and the respective inter-process communication (IPC) points
with the help of the reverse engineering tool-suite Bauhaus
[3]. This part of the analysis is carried out at the level
of the software architecture, reducing the analysis effort.
In the second step, we use these architectural information
to slice the code and conduct focused data flow analyses
on the software slices, resulting in the actual information
flows that are used to construct an information flow graph
at the architectural layer. The information flow graph can
then be used by developers and security experts to identify
malicious flows and the graph can be checked against a
policy of legitimate information flows. Moreover, an ab-
stract representation can help end users in assessing the risk
from a new application. The advantage of the proposed two-
layer approach is its scalability. In addition, the approach is
practically relevant and has real-world environments as the
benchmark.
In summary, our analysis method can be considered com-
plementary to other static code analysis approaches that can
dectect implementation bugs such as SQL injection and Cross-
site scripting vulnerablities [4]. Our approach, however, is
focused more on the aspect of program comprehension for
security and makes transparent interactions between differ-
ent applications.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
Section II, we briefly describe the background on Android,
Android’s security concepts and the software analysis tools
used for our analyses. We, then, list possible attack scenarios
on the Android platform and show the relevance of the tran-
sitivity of trust problem before discussing the data sources
and sinks of Android applications. In Section V, we present
our approach to the security analysis of Android applica-
tions in detail, followed by a case study in Section VI. We
discuss the advantages but also limitations of our approach
in Section VII. After listing the related work, we conclude
in Section IX.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Android Programming Model
Applications on the Android platform are developed using
the Java programming language. Android applications are
not executed on traditional Java Virtual Machines, but are
converted into the custom DEX bytecode and interpreted
with the Dalvik virtual machine. The Android SDK supports
most of the Java Platform, Standard Edition and contains,
in addition, Android-specific extensions, including telephony
functions and a UI framework.
Android applications consist of four basic component types:
activities, services, content providers, and broadcast receivers.
Activities constitute the presentation layer of an application
and allow users to directly interact with the application.
Services represent background processes without a user in-
terface. Content providers are data stores that allow de-
velopers to share databases across application boundaries.
Broadcast receivers receive and react to broadcast messages,
for example the “battery low” message from the Android
OS or messages from other applications. For communication
between the individual components of applications, inter-
process communication (IPC) provides a means to pass mes-
sages between different applications, activities, and services
[5]. Android uses messages that contain meta information
and arbitrary data, called intents, for IPC.
Android components follow a lifecycle that is managed
by the OS. As a consequence, there is no main() method
from which the applications are started. Instead, the An-
droid OS calls the lifecycle methods, such as onCreate(),
whenever e.g. an activity is started for the first time or a
new message is received by a service. Further information
about component lifecycles is available from the Android
Developer’s Guide [6].
B. Android Security Concepts
Android has two basic methods of security enforcement
[5]. Firstly, applications run as Linux processes with indi-
vidual Unix users and thus are separated from each other.
This way, a security hole in one application does not affect
other applications. However, as mentioned above, Android
provides IPC mechanisms that need to be secured. The An-
droid middleware implements a reference monitor to mediate
the access to application components based upon permission
labels defined for the component being accessed. If an appli-
cation intends to access a component of another application,
the end user has to grant an appropriate permission. The re-
quested permissions are specified in the application’s policy
file.
All permissions requested by an application are granted by
the end user at installation time, i.e., the permission assign-
ment cannot be changed at runtime. During the installation
process, a list of dangerous permissions is presented to the
end user in a dialog window and needs to be confirmed.
Furthermore, the security model has several refinements
that increase the model’s complexity. One example is the
concept of shared user IDs that allow different applications
to share the same user ID if the applications are issued by
the same developer. Another refinement are protected APIs:
Several security-critical system resources can be accessed
directly rather than using components. Examples of such
resources are Internet services that allow an application to
open arbitrary network sockets and have full access to the
Internet and outgoing call APIs that allow an application to
monitor, modify, or abort outgoing calls. In order to mediate
access to such resources, additional in-code security checks
have been implemented. Moreover, permissions are assigned
protection levels such as “normal”, “dangerous”, and “signa-
ture”. The Android security model also supports delegation
concepts such as pending intents and URI permissions that
can only be checked at the code level rather than at the
policy level [5].
C. Architecture-Based Analysis with the Bauhaus Tool
The Bauhaus tool-suite is a reverse engineering tool-suite
that has been developed for more than ten years and has been
used in several industry projects [3]. Bauhaus allows one to
deduce two abstractions from the source code, namely the
Intermediate Language (IML) and the resource flow graph
(RFG). The IML representation is, in essence, an attributed
syntax tree (an enhanced AST) that contains the detailed
program structure information such as loop statements, vari-
able definitions and name bindings. The RFG representation
works at a higher abstraction level and represents architec-
turally relevant information of the software. The RFG is a
hierarchical graph that consists of typed nodes and edges
representing elements like types, components and routines
and their relations. The information that is stored in the RFG
is structured in views, where each view represents a different
aspect of the architecture, e.g. a call graph. Technically,
views are subgraphs of the RFG.
Bauhaus supports a meta-model and thus allows one to
define new node and edge types. Currently, RFG profiles
exist for C/C++, C#, and Java, representing syntactical ele-
ments of the respective language and their relations. For ex-
ample, typical node types for Java are Class, Method, and
Member; edge types are Member Set, Member Use, and
Dispatching_Call among others. In particular, an ex-
tension of the Java-based RFG model with Android-specific
node and edge types is also possible.
For visualizing the different views of RFGs, the Graph-
ical Visualiser (Gravis) has been implemented [7]. Gravis
facilitates high-level analysis of the system and provides a
rich functionality to produce new views by RFG analyses or
to manipulate generated views.
D. Low-Level Analysis with the Soot Tool
The Bauhaus RFG represents the software architecture,
but this abstract representation lacks detailed program in-
formation that is needed for data flow analysis. Thus, for
our goal of tracing the data flow through the application,
we need an enhanced AST. The Bauhaus IML-generator
supports Java program code below version 1.5, but for de-
veloping and analyzing Android applications, we need to
analyze Java 1.5 code and above [8]. To deal with this issue,
we chose Soot, a well-established Java analysis tool [9], as
a basis for performing the data flow analysis.
Soot was designed as a Java bytecode optimization frame-
work in 1999. In the following years, this framework has
been enhanced with several other analysis methods, like
points-to analysis [10] or dynamic inter-procedural analysis
[11]. Soot provides the ability to inject self-written analy-
ses into the existing analysis chain on every intermediate
representation [9]. Our analysis takes place on the Jimple
representation, a 3-address code representation. The built-
in call graph generation and flow analysis framework does
not facilitate our analysis, since, to take advantage of the
Android framework semantics as described in Section II-A,
a custom static data flow analysis is required.
III. THE TRANSITIVITY OF TRUST PROBLEM
We first describe different attack scenarios that may lead
to undesirable information flows on the Android platform. In
particular, these scenarios show that real attacks are possible
that exploit transitive trust issues. Thereafter, we argue that
the transitivity problem is more general, not restricted to
Android or other smartphone platforms.
A. Threats from Android Applications
We identified three classes of attack scenarios through
Android applications against the confidentiality of user data,
depicted in Figure 2. In the simplest case, scenario (a),
a maliciously crafted application is published through the
Android market. While the application may provide a useful
function on the surface, behind the back of the user, it
transfers sensitive data (1) to a Web service on the Internet
(2). The Android security concept requires the end user to
notice the combination of permissions to read sensitive data
and access the Internet and cancel the installation. There are
several reasons why this assumption may fail:
• End users are used to accepting permission requests
with every installation of applications, thus tempted to
just acknowledge the shown list;
• Many applications require rather broad permissions, for
example, Internet access for update checks;
• The dangerous permissions may be “hidden” between
less critical or irrelevant permissions, such as control-
ling the display backlight;
• In a subconscious risk assessment, the end user may
deem the usefulness of the application so high that the
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Figure 2. Android attack scenarios
risk may be acceptable despite the unusual combination
of permissions.
Moreover, as seen in a recent attack, applications can access
sensitive data without explicitly requiring a permission, for
example the phone serial number [12]. One way to counter
these kinds of attacks is to make the information flows from
critical sources to sinks transparent. For end users, the per-
missions listed in the affirmation dialog could be enriched
with indications how these relate to information flows.
Scenario (b) is considerably more complex since the at-
tacker takes advantage of application interaction mechanisms
in Android. Similar to scenario (a), the goal is to compro-
mise the end users’ confidentiality by disclosing sensitive
data. To hide the critical combination of permissions to read
sensible data and to send it to remote services, reading and
sending are split into separate applications. The first appli-
cation appears to be “local-only” and has read access to
sensitive data (1). This application interacts using the An-
droid IPC mechanisms, for example, a service binding, with
a second application without the end users’ knowledge (2).
The second application requires Internet access permissions
and can thus forward the data to a remote service (3). The
interaction between the two applications can be completely
hidden from the end user. There are two approaches to pre-
vent this attack: either to make the information flows within
each application explicit, in this case from a data source
to the Android IPC and from Android IPC to a data sink.
Alternatively, to analyze all installed applications to identify
combinations of applications that can interact to create an
information flow from a critical data source to a remote data
sink.
Scenario (c) is a variant of (b), but with malicious inten-
tions by either the first or the second application. If the first
one is malicious as shown in Figure 2, it will read sensitive
data as in scenario (b). It will then abuse an erroneous appli-
cation into tricking it to transfer the data to a remote target.
In the second case, not shown, an erroneous application that
may read sensitive data offers this data through Android IPC
and a malicious application retrieves the data to forward
it to a remote service. Repositories, such as OpenIntents1,
that offer interfaces for several inter-component interactions
may facilitate this kind of attack. Apart from making the
critical information flows transparent, it is helpful to val-
idate whether adequate permission enforcement is enacted
on critical information flow paths within applications, either
manifest-based or programmatic to counter this threat. If
permissions are enforced, end users have a chance of notic-
ing unusual combinations of permission requirements that
do not match with the claimed application purpose.
B. Transitivity Issues on Different Platforms
The transitivity of trust problem as discussed before can
be regarded as an instance of a more general security prob-
lem in software, namely, undesirable interaction of different
applications and components, respectively. This problem has
been described in the literature, e.g., by Piessens [13] and
Anderson [14]. Transitivity issues between applications are
not limited to the Android platform or in general to mo-
bile platforms. Android, however, is a classical example of
such systems. First, it supports the mobile code paradigm
which supports dynamically loading new applications. Fur-
thermore, although there has been implemented a separation
1http://www.openintents.org
mechanism for applications (or Android components), ac-
cess between the separated applications is still possible via
IPC in order to allow the development of practically useful
applications.
Similar remarks hold for other systems such as multi-
function smartcards as stated, for example, by Anderson
[14]. These cards allow one to install different applications,
e.g., one application for electronic passport functionality and
another one for digital signature to allow for legally binding
business. In particular, the Javacard technology provides the
possibility to dynamically load new Java applets [15]. In
order to protect the applications from each other, the concept
of “application firewalls” has been introduced. Similarly to
Android, however, there exists a mechanism to share Java
objects between applications. As a consequence, transitivity
issues stemming from interacting applications are again con-
ceivable as first discussed by McGraw and Felten [16]. In
this scenario, an application A allows a trusted application B
to access a sensitive object x via a virtual method x.foo().
Application B then gives a third application (not necessarily
trusted by A) access to a method y.bar(), which calls
x.foo(). This way, C indirectly has access to object x,
although A has not explicitly given that permission.
The interaction problem and specifically transitivity issues
also exist in SOA, which is based on extensible systems such
as JavaEE and .NET. In particular, Web services, which often
implement SOA, aim at coupling and composing services de-
pending on the needs of an organization. As Karp et al. point
out, service chaining leads to transitivity problems [17]. We
now briefly discuss this point in the context of Enterprise
Resource Planning (ERP) systems, which often extensively
support SOA. SAP, for example, makes the NetWeaver plat-
form available to integrate different applications such as the
Human Resources module or Material Management. In par-
ticular, SAP NetWeaver can be used to allow different SAP
modules or even external applications access to centrally ad-
ministered data such as master data (e.g., about customers or
vendors), which are sensitive for an organization. A business
process such as a loan origination workflow, for example,
may then access or manipulate master data of a customer
via a Web service. This loan origination workflow itself
might be exposed as a service within the organization. If
this service is not secured appropriately (e.g., the role-based
access control policy is erroneous), then it is conceivable
that these sensitive data might be accessed by unauthorized
actors through the service.
In summary, application interaction w.r.t. transitivity is
a prevalent problem on many platforms. In this paper, we
focus on the Android platform, although the techniques we
use can be applied to other systems as well. Specifically, we
then need to map the system-specific programming concepts
to our analysis infrastructure and, e.g., introduce specific
modeling elements at the RFG level.
Description Exemplary API calls
Invoke an
Activity by Intent
(in the foreground)
Intent intent = new
Intent(this, Receiver.class);
startActivity(intent);
Broadcast messages to
registered listeners
(one-to-many)
sendBroadcast(intent);
sendStickyBroadcast(intent);
sendOrderedBroadcast(intent);
Communication with
Service
(in the background)
startService();
stopService();
bindService();
Table I
INTER-COMPONENT COMMUNICATION MECHANISMS
Data source Criticality Accessible data
Content Provider high contains passwords, contact list
SMS/MMS high sensitive information
User input high passwords
Files high business documents
Network (HTTP) high protected files
Bluetooth high contacts, files, images
Camera medium observation of image data
C2DM medium sensitive URI
Location Manager medium observation of location data
Device identifiers medium personal identification
Table II
DATA SOURCES (INCOMING CHANNELS)
IV. CRITICAL INFORMATION SOURCES
AND SINKS IN ANDROID
Our approach to information flow analysis is to analyze
inter-component flows from information sources, such as
contact lists, to channels through which information leaves
the device context. Thus, we must identify communication
mechanisms between components as well as critical incom-
ing and outgoing channels on the Android platform. The
incoming channels are referred to as “data sources”, outgo-
ing channels as “data sinks”. We identified a list of inter-
component communication mechanisms, sources and sinks
by exploring of the Android application framework and the
provided samples. Inter-component communication takes place
between the Android component types as described in Sec-
tion II-A. Table I lists the primary communication types on
the Android platform. For the sake of brevity, only individual
examples of the API calls are given.
The origin of the data in a information flow needs to be
known to effectively analyze the flows’ criticality. Table II
provides a list of data sources that allow the flow of infor-
mation into the device and application context. Enck et al.
similarly identified data sources for the placement of security
hooks in their dynamic analysis, categorizing sources into
sensors, such as location sensors and camera, information
databases and device identifiers [18]. The criticality of a
data source is determined by the data that the source makes
potentially accessible. As the criticality depends on various
factors, we only evaluate the criticality for average users at
this point to give a risk estimation. We will conduct an in-
Data sink Attack
complexity
Attack scenario/
attack requirements (exemplary)
Network
(WebView)
medium manipulation of URI/
access to URI
SMS/MMS medium manipulation of data or number
Bluetooth high influencing the transferred file/
proximity, control of receiver, com-
pleted pairing
Content
Provider
high malicious application misleads into
writing into content provider/
need to specify content provider URI
Files high malicious application misleads into
writing into files/
need to specify file name
Google
Translate API
very high manipulation of address resolution/
access to OS services
MapView very high manipulation of address resolution/
access to OS services
Table III
DATA SINKS (OUTGOING CHANNELS)
depth analysis of source criticality as part of our future work.
For the criticality values in Table II, high criticality indicates
that the impact is potentially significant. Medium criticality
is assigned for observation scenarios, where consequences
resulting from attacks are limited for average users, depend-
ing on the monitored person in a given case. Low criticality
indicates that there is only little impact that most users might
accept the annoyance. An example of a data source with
medium criticality is Android’s Location Manager, which
provides access to the device’s geographical location and is
used in this paper’s case study. Bluetooth is a data source
with high criticality because of the possibility to access
critical data like contacts, files and images on paired devices
through this channel.
In Table III, we list data sinks of Android applications
with possible attack scenarios and the requirements for the
realization of this scenario as well as a valuation of the attack
complexity. While there are severity metrics for software
vulnerabilities, the existing models do not match the re-
quirements of the evaluation of information flow data sinks.
We assess the attack complexity through the complexity
of possible attack scenarios. For medium attack complex-
ity, it is sufficient for a malicious application to trick a
single application into proxying sensitive data to external
destinations. In cases that require several applications to be
coordinated for an attack, we rate the attack complexity as
high. Very high attack complexity indicates that it is, in
addition, necessary to modify the operation system and/or
external services, such as the Google Maps Web service.
An example of a data sink with medium attack complexity
is a WebView which displays web pages as part of the UI.
To channel data out of the device context through this sink,
a malicious application has to manipulate the target URI. In
contrast, content providers are data sinks with high attack
complexity because a malicious application must mislead
one application into writing into a content provider and an-
other component afterwards into using this content provider
to channel data out.
Following the standard risk assessment approach of Risk =
Probability × Impact , the risk of an information flow can
be approximated from the source criticality (impact) and the
sinks attack complexity (probability). Thus, a low attack
complexity of data sinks combined with a high criticality
of data sources results in a maximum risk.
V. INFORMATION FLOW ANALYSIS OF ANDROID
APPLICATIONS
To improve the transparency with respect to the transitiv-
ity of trust problem on the Android platform, we propose to
analyze the information flows between the applications. We
first introduce the analysis method on a high level before
we describe our prototype implementation of the analysis.
A. Analysis Method
Our analysis approach aims to identify undesirable in-
formation flows between different Android applications and
components, respectively. In order to analyze a larger set of
applications (as it usually exists on an end user’s phone),
we did not directly employ the AST for the entire analysis.
We rather employ two layers of abstraction in the analysis,
beginning at the level of the software architecture to identify
the Android components, before diving into the AST details
to enrich the architecture and, lastly, deriving the final results
from the architecture. In this last step, we employ the archi-
tecture to compose information flows through single An-
droid components into information flows spanning an entire
application, and thereafter compose these intra-application
information flows to inter-application information flows. All
architectural-level analyses are conducted on a hierarchi-
cal architecture graph that represents architectural elements,
such as methods and classes, as nodes and relations between
the elements, such as calls, as edges. In the following, we
explain our analysis algorithm in more detail.
A listing of the high-level algorithm is shown in Ruby-
style pseudo-code in Listing 1. The algorithm starts from
a set of Android applications that should be considered for
inter-application information flows. In the first architectural
analysis phase, Android components are identified for each
application. Components are the basic entities in the An-
droid programming model that communicate through IPC,
including services, activities and broadcast receivers (see
Section II-A). In further architecture-level analyses, we search
for the IPC entry and exit points for each component using
architectural patterns. These points are the basis for the
detailed analysis of intra-component information flows at
the AST level. As shown in Listing 2, backward slicing is
conducted on the AST, starting from each of the exit points.
# input : applications (applications to be
analyzed)
# output : critical_flows (flows that lead from
device sources to device sinks and could
leak information)
# CodePoint: [Class, Method, Call]
# PointSpec: [PointType, CodePoint]
# Flow: [Component, PointSpec, PointSpec]
inner_application_flows = []
critical_sinks = []
critical_sources = []
applications.each do |application|
inner_component_flows = []
source_points_of_entry = []
sink_points_of_exit = []
components = application.identify_components
components.each do |component|
points_of_entry = component.
identify_points_of_entry
source_points_of_entry += points_of_entry.
select_sources
points_of_exit = component.
identify_points_of_exit
sink_points_of_exit += points_of_exit.
select_sinks
inner_component_flows +=
inner_component_flows_for(component,
points_of_entry, points_of_exit)
end
inner_application_flows +=
inner_application_flows_for(application,
inner_component_flows,
source_points_of_entry,
sink_points_of_exit)
critical_source += source_points_of_entry.
select_device_sources
critical_sinks += sink_points_of_exit.
select_device_sinks
end
critical_flows = []
flow_graph = generate_flow_graph(
inner_application_flows)
critical_sinks.each do |critical_sink|
reachable_elements = flow_graph.
reachable_from(critical_sink)
critical_sources.each do |critical_source|
if reachable_elements.contains(
critical_source)
critical_flows << Flow.new(nil,
critical_sink, critical_source)
end
end
end
Listing 1. High-level analysis algorithm
def inner_component_flows_for (component,
points_of_entry, points_of_exit)
flows = []
points_of_exit.each do |point_of_exit|
backward_slice = point_of_exit.
backward_slice_on_ast
points_of_entry.each do |point_of_entry|
if backward_slice.contains(point_of_entry
)
flows << Flow.new(component,
point_of_entry, point_of_exit,
backward_slice)
end
end
end
return flows
end
Listing 2. Information flows inside each individual component
The goal is to identify information flows that reach one of
the entry points of the component, representing an intra-
component information flow.
At the architectural level, the intra-component flows are
used to enrich the information flow graph with communica-
tion links within each application, resulting in a component-
level flow graph. Next, we identify information flows on
the level of individual applications. We focus on flows that
originate outside the application context, pass through it and
leave the application again. As depicted in Listing 3, we
conduct a reachability search on the flow graph to find the in-
formation flows within each application. Searching the flow
graph significantly reduces the search space since we only
consider the identified flows and not the entire AST. We start
out from selected entry and exit points: sources and sinks.
Sources are entry points of components that connect to the
outside of the application, for example, receiving broadcasts.
Sinks are the opposite, those exit points that leave from the
application, for example, starting application-external activ-
ities or accessing Web pages. From the reachability analysis
on the component-level flow graph, we identify all flows
between sources and sinks within the application.
At this point, we found information flows that pass through
applications, but only for individual applications. For inter-
application flows, in the last phase, we identify the informa-
tion flows that involve critical sources and sinks as described
in Section IV. An application-level flow graph is constructed
from the intra-application flows as the basis for the identifi-
cation of critical flows. Again, a reachability search is con-
ducted, starting from critical sinks and searching for flows to
one of the critical sources. As a result, all information flows
are known that originate at critical sources and terminate at
critical sinks.
B. Prototype Implementation
We implemented the analysis method described above as a
prototype that identifies information flows between Android
def inner_application_flows_for (application,
inner_component_flows,
source_points_of_entry, sink_points_of_exit
)
flows = []
flow_graph = generate_flow_graph(
inner_component_flows)
sink_points_of_exit.each do |
sink_point_of_exit|
reachable_elements = flow_graph.
reachable_from(sink_point_of_exit)
source_points_of_entry.each do |
source_point_of_entry|
if reachable_elements.contains(
source_point_of_entry)
flows << Flow.new(application,
source_point_of_entry,
sink_point_of_exit)
end
end
end
return flows
end
Listing 3. Information flows inside each individual application
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Figure 3. Analysis workflow
applications and the Android platform. The prototype uses
two distinct tools to implement the analysis. As depicted in
Figure 3, we employ the Bauhaus tool suite at the architec-
tural level and the Soot tool for AST-based analyses.
Identify components and IPC points: In the first phase
of the analysis, we identify the components as well as the
associated entry and exit points on the architectural level.
The architecture-level analyses are based upon the RFG that
the Bauhaus tool generates from the Java bytecode of the
analyzed applications. From the global RFG, we create a re-
duced information flow subgraph (view), containing only the
relevant parts of the studied components. The relevant parts
are identified through the search for relevant Android frame-
work patterns that are described in Section IV. The Bauhaus
tool-suite provides Python language bindings to read and
modify RFGs. We developed a Python script that prototyp-
ically identifies relevant parts through pattern matching and
marks the related methods, classes and calls by adding the
nodes and edges to an information flow view.
To interface with the further, AST-based data flow anal-
ysis, the identified methods and classes are listed together
with the critical calls in an XML-based exchange format that
is passed to the next analysis stage.
Identify component-level flows: In order to find infor-
mation flows between entry and exit points in components,
an intra-component data flow analysis is carried out at the
AST level. We use the previously identified entry and exit
points to focus the data-flow analysis and significantly re-
duce the analysis effort at this level. We developed analysis
algorithms for the Soot tool that utilize the known Android
framework semantics. For each class of entry and exit points
that is supported by the prototype, a corresponding analysis
building block has been implemented. The behavior of the
Android platform prevents the Soot framework from gener-
ating a sufficient call graph for our analyses. One reason is
that there is no single entry point to the Android applica-
tions, such as the traditional main() method, but several,
depending on the IPC mechanism. More importantly, there
are several, partly dynamic framework semantics that need
to be part of the call graph, such as UI event handlers, but
are difficult to be statically analyzed.
To identify the intra-component information flows, we
search for all program points that affect a given exit point
in a component. Therefore, we chose a static backward slic-
ing technique as described by Weiser [19]. If the backward
slicing reaches an entry point of the component under inves-
tigation, we consider this an information flow for the specific
entry and exit points.
Identify application-level flows: The component-level
flow data from the AST-based analysis is now employed
to enrich the information flow graph. The primary purpose
of the information flow graph is to allow developers and
security experts to quickly identify flows and determine the
risks related to the flows. The information flow graph is
represented as an RFG view in the Bauhaus tool suite and is
extended as follows. For each information flow that has been
identified in the previous analysis step, the intra-component
flow edge is drawn between the entry and exit point and
the corresponding nodes are added to the view. If the ori-
gin of the current flow is of type “source”, an information
flow edge is inserted from the origin to the point of en-
try inside the current information flow. Additionally, for all
types of destinations, an edge is inserted between the point
of exit and the destination’s point of entry. We derive the
application-level information flows by conducting a reacha-
bility analysis based on the information flow graph, starting
from exit points that leave the application, backwards to
entry points that enter the application. In a last step, we
combine the RFGs of multiple applications to identify the
critical flows between sources and sinks in the application
ecosystem again through a reachability analysis. The result-
ing view for the case study below is shown in Figure 6 as
it is displayed in Bauhaus’ Gravis tool.
VI. EVALUATION
We evaluate our approach by means of a case study of a
public transport-related application and thereafter show how
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Figure 4. Case study setup for public transport application
the analysis results can be displayed in a usable manner.
A. Public Transport Application
As a case study, we chose to analyze two real-world An-
droid applications that are available on the Android Market
with installations on more than 2000 devices. There are
several reasons for selecting these two applications. One
pragmatic aspect is that one of the authors developed the ap-
plications so that we had access to the applications’ bytecode
as the basis for our analysis. The case study did not affect the
design or implementation of the applications since the devel-
opment of the applications were finished when our research
work on the analysis started. A more important criterion for
choosing this application was that it encompassed different
frequently-used Android concepts such as starting activities
or binding to services and a multi-component design (see
Section II-A). With this case study, we also demonstrate that
our analysis approach supports more complex semantics of
the Android framework such as registering and executing
remote service callbacks. The two applications also demon-
strate that the transitivity of trust is a necessary concept,
although the missing transparency may cause the concept to
be misused.
The first application is called “PubTrans”2, an interface
to a public transport routing Web application, primarily im-
proving the input form to take advantage of the context
(current location and time as well as previous searches).
PubTrans takes parameters such as origin, destination and
desired arrival time and sends a query to the routing Web
application. Thus, the PubTrans application requires unre-
stricted Web access privileges.
When entering the public transport routing parameters, the
user may choose to take the current address as the origin.
Since using detailed location data is not strictly necessary
for the application’s main goal, location queries have been
factored out into a separate Android component that is in-
stalled as a separate application. As shown in Figure 4,
2To preserve the anonymity of the submission, we employ pseudonyms
for the applications and removed the original package names.
<component>
<class>com...pub_trans.ResultWebView</class>
<point-of-entry type="start-activity">
<origin type="activity">
</origin>
<class>com..pub_trans.ResultWebView</class>
<method>onCreate</method>
<call>getIntent</call>
</point-of-entry>
<point-of-entry>
...
</point-of-entry>
<point-of-exit type="call">
<destination type="sink">
<class>android.webkit.WebView</class>
</destination>
<class>com..pub_trans.ResultWebView</class>
<method>loadResults</method>
</point-of-exit>
<point-of-exit>
...
</point-of-exit>
</component>
<component>
...
</component>
Listing 4. Excerpt of analysis input
the PubTransLocation application thus requires location data
permissions. With two separate applications, a user may
choose whether she would like to grant location access.
Still, as shown in the figure, there is an information flow
between both applications. This information flow is required
to fulfill the intended goals, but it was not explicitly granted
at installation time. Although not harmful, this information
flow is an example of the missing transparency with regard
to the transitivity of trust on the Android platform.
We now describe our analysis approach in more detail
with the help of this case study. In Figure 4, we can see that
our system consists of two applications with three Android
components. We can identify the entry and exit points of
the components by means of the architecture-level analysis
(“Identify components and IPC points” step in Section V-B).
Taking a closer look at the ResultWebView activity, we
obtain as an entry point the onCreate() method and as
an exit point the call to the Android WebView UI element,
which is at the same time a possible data sink as described
in Section IV. Thereafter, we interface with the Soot tool
to perform the detailed analysis on the AST. We use an
XML-based exchange format to pass on the architectural
information to Soot. The component description excerpt in
Listing 4 displays two IPC points in the ResultWebView
component.
On the AST level, we carry out the Soot analysis with
the backward slicing algorithm (“Identify component-level
flows” step), based on the component and IPC point in-
formation. For the ResultWebView component, we need
to verify, for example, whether an intra-component infor-
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<information-flow status="checked">
<class>com...pub_trans.ResultWebView</class>
<origin type="activity">
<class>com...pub_trans.EfaQuery</class>
</origin>
<point-of-entry type="start-activity">
<class>com..pub_trans.ResultWebView</class>
<method>onCreate</method>
<call>getIntent</call>
</point-of-entry>
<point-of-exit type="call">
<class>com..pub_trans.ResultWebView</class>
<method>loadResults</method>
</point-of-exit>
<destination type="sink">
<class>android.webkit.WebView</class>
</destination>
</information-flow>
<infortmation-flow>
...
</infortmation-flow>
Listing 5. Component-level flows as output from analysis
mation flow exists between the IPC points onCreate()
and WebView. Figure 5 depicts a didactically simplified
excerpt of the backward slice production corresponding to
the information flow from the ResultWebView entry point
onCreate to WebView. In the figure, the backward slice
starting point is the exit point of the component, calling
loadUrl() on a WebView component. Beginning here,
we look up all variables passed with the method call and
move backward along the statements inside the method load-
Results() to identify each point that affects the exit point.
When the beginning of this method is reached, we have a
set of variables that affect the exit point and we evaluate
whether any of these are method parameters to do further
analysis on affected points, maybe, in other methods of the
ResultWebView class. In the shown case, the variable
extras, marked green in Figure 5, is a parameter, so we
trace where the current method was called. The method was
called by onCreate() that was described as a starting
point for activities in Section II-A. Inside onCreate(),
loadResults() is called with the returned value of the
inherited method getIntent(). This inherited method is
another artifact of Android activities and returns the intent
with a set of parameters that started the activity. Thus, we
identified an intra-component information flow between the
entry point onCreate and the exit point WebView.
The results from the AST-level analysis are passed back
to the architectural analysis through an exchange file, shown
in Listing 5. In the last step, the information flow data
are used to draw appropriate edges in the information flow
view on the architectural level (“Identify application-level
flows” step). The information flow view of the resulting RFG
is shown in Figure 6 as displayed in the Bauhaus Gravis
visualization. When comparing the information flow graph
to the case study set up in Figure 4, one can follow the
Figure 7. End-user information flow visualization
information flow from the location provider source through
the three components to the Internet. Thus, the developed
method successfully identified the potentially harmful, at
least intransparent information flow. While this detailed visu-
alization is helpful for developers who need to find out which
architectural elements are related to potentially unexpected
information flows, security engineers and end users need
significantly more abstract visualizations. For this reason,
further graph searches are conducted to identify the critical
flows that are to be displayed at higher levels of abstraction.
B. Visualization for Information Flow Transparency
As indicated in the previous section, the developer-oriented
visualization in Figure 6 is too detailed to be of use for
end users. To provide an adequate level of abstraction, we
generate a more abstract visualization from the analysis re-
sults, depicted in Figure 7. The goal is to provide insights
into the potentially malicious information flows between the
applications and critical sources and sinks. We display those
information flows that take advantage of the transitivity of
trust. First, we show all information flows that start out at
a critical source and lead to a critical sink. Additionally, to
prevent false negatives, we also display flows to the sink
from applications on the path.
One option is for end users to employ this visualization
on-demand to gain an overview of hidden information flows
on their devices. Arguably even more effectively, the visual-
ization might serve as an addition to the existing installation
process. In this case, additional information flows that are
facilitated by the new application are shown after the user
has accepted the permissions that the application requires
but before the actual installation. The latter case is what
Figure 7 depicts.
While currently implemented as a separate application,
the information flow transparency view could be integrated
into the installer at a later time. Also, the flow transparency
application currently reads the information flow data from a
file that has been previously generated on a PC. We may port
the analysis to the Android platform as part of our future
work. Alternatively, the analysis may be conducted by the
Android Market owner when the application is uploaded to
the market and provided at installation time in addition to
the application package. The generated information flow data
may additionally be used by security engineers to assess the
security of a set of applications. For example, the market
supervision could use an appropriate visualization to identify
potentially harmful applications. Information security staff at
companies might also be interested in analyzing the security
of applications on their employees’ smartphones.
VII. DISCUSSION
We discuss the advantages as well as the limitations of our
approach. In particular, this discussion covers aspects such
as false positives, scalability and the relationship to dynamic
analysis.
A. Case Study Results
The positive result from the case study is promising, in
particular, when considering that the studied applications are
real-world applications that have not been modified for the
developed method. However, the proposed method depends
on framework semantics and thus is limited to those sources,
sinks and IPC mechanisms that are implemented. As of now,
we have discovered the critical mechanisms that are listed
in Section IV. Currently, the algorithm is implemented for
the location provider source, the WebView sink as well as
startActivity and bindService IPC. We are plan-
ning to add the other mechanisms as part of our future
work. In general, unsupported source or sink types will result
in false negatives. Moreover, while evaluating the proposed
method, we discovered two aspects that are difficult to auto-
matically analyze and may lead to additional false negatives.
Firstly, user inputs can contain credentials and need to be
taken into account as a data source. Also, information flows
involving content providers as intermediate step are difficult
to follow without deeper knowledge of content provider URI
semantics.
B. False Positives
Similar to other static analyses, our approach may lead to
false positives that can be produced on different levels of our
analyses. The first source of false positives is that we find
all information flows from critical data sources to data sinks
irrespective of whether they are intended or unintended. In
our case study, it is intended by the programmer that the
location information is passed to the Web page because
it is the only way to retrieve the requested information.
Therefore, this information flow is a false positive from the
programmer’s viewpoint. And it may also be a false positive
for an end user if she is aware that the feature necessarily
needs the location data.
The second source of false positives is the underlying
data flow analysis. This analysis may find data flows that
are not existent due to overestimation. In such a case, we
may identify a connection between a data source and a data
sink within an application that may not occur in practice.
This false positive on the lower level of our analysis may
lead to false positives in the set of possible inter-component
information flows.
C. Scalability
The highest complexity of the proposed algorithm lies in
the backward slicing algorithm. Specifically, the construction
of the internal data structure for slicing, i.e., the AST or to be
more precise, the program dependence graph (PDG) is the
time-consuming step [20]. By isolating the backslicing runs
for each component, we are confident that the whole algo-
rithm will scale well in relation to the number of examined
components. By selecting only potential paths between the
components’ entry and exit points with the help of the RFG
(see the step “Identify components and IPC points”), the
number of the nodes of the PDG will be reduced. We do not
have to build a complete PDG for all Android components.
The effort for the backward slicing algorithm then is linear
in the size of the PDG [20].
D. Dynamic versus Static Analysis
The focus of our work lies on static code analysis, which
in principle can be carried out offline, e.g., on other hardware
as done in our current prototype implementation. Dynamic
analysis is another approach to address the problem of un-
desirable information flows on Android. Specifically, the
TaintDroid tool implements dynamic monitoring of privacy-
relevant flows by modifying the Dalvik VM and the Android
kernel [18]. Instead of static analysis before installation,
TaintDroid complements our approach by offering analyses
at runtime. While TaintDroid aims to minimize the perfor-
mance overhead, static analyses can also afford to carry out
more detailed analyses. For example, the tools employed by
our approach allow us to even detect indirect information
flows induced by control flows [21] although this is not the
topic of this paper.
One argument in favor of the dynamic analysis of Android
applications is that no source code is needed [18]. Android
uses a different distribution format called DEX, which is a
customized bytecode format being register-based rather than
employing an operand stack. However, we have obtained
promising early results with the dex2jar tool, which trans-
lates DEX to Java bytecode [22]. Since our analyses work on
Java bytecode (see Section V-B), we also applied our tools to
DEX code for the case study. However, applying the dex2jar
tool to larger application sets remains future work.
Not all properties can be inferred from the code statically.
One example is the implicit intent decomposition mechanism
in the Android framework. It decides at runtime among all
registered components which component offers the requested
intent features and accordingly suits to the implicit intent
call. At this point, static analysis cannot determine which
components will be connected at runtime and which com-
ponent the platform will choose, if there exists more than
one suitable component.
In the end, a hybrid approach consisting of both static and
dynamic analyses will be reasonable. This way, static anal-
yses can be improved by information gained from runtime
analyses. Furthermore, users who cannot afford to use static
analysis tools can rely on the TaintDroid approach, whereas
in business or governmental scenarios as well as at market
entry, the static approach can be employed additionally.
VIII. RELATED WORK
There exist a plethora of works for the static security
analysis of software, e.g., discussed by Chess and West [23].
The works on static information flow analysis for security
often resides at the source code level. Some approaches deal
with programmer-written annotations for information flows
that permit static code checks [24], [25], [26]. Moreover,
the language-based security extensions in JFlow [24] support
the modeling of access control. This allows one to statically
check code privileges, but all modeled access controls will
be removed after the JFlow compiler processing. This kind
of language-based security analysis is limited to the use of
annotations by programmers at the source-code level. Our
analysis methods, however, works without code annotations
aiming to detect undesirable information flow between dif-
ferent applications and components, respectively.
In another approach, type-based security combines anno-
tations with dependence graph-based information flow con-
trol [27]. Hammer’s proposed analysis uses the Java byte-
code and a succinct security policy specification that is in-
serted as annotations in code comments. Although both ap-
proaches aim to detect information flow violations of Java-
based applications, they differ in the analysis techniques they
use. We employ an analysis approach using the RFG to
restrict the search space and thereafter carrying out a more
focused analysis at the detail level. Hammer uses the com-
plete dependence graph to directly conduct the information
flow analysis. In addition, Hammer’s method requires code
annotations for the security labeling, similar to JFlow. This
way, this approach can only be applied by the developer, but
neither by the Android Market owner nor the end user.
Chandra and Franz implemented an information flow frame-
work for Java applications using static as well as dynamic
checks [21]. Static checks are needed to improve the dy-
namic analysis such that information about alternative con-
trol paths is also available. The approach works at the byte-
code level and is fully compatible with the class file format.
In general, all aforementioned approaches tackle the problem
of indirect information flow induced by the control flow of
applications, whereas we currently only analyze direct flows.
The focus of our work lies on an inter-application anal-
ysis. Furthermore, our techniques are tailored towards the
Android platform by considering Android-specific program-
ming concepts as well as data sources and sinks. Certainly, it
is worthwhile to address indirect information flows in future
work.
Important research prototypes from static security analysis
are e.g. MOPS [28], Eau Claire [29], BLAST [30], and
LAPSE [4]. MOPS uses temporal logics as formalism and
model checking to discover issues such as race conditions in
C programs. Eau Claire allows the formulation of pre- and
postconditions as code annotations and is based on a theorem
prover. Eau Claire detects general security problems such
as buffer overflows. BLAST uses (lazy) abstraction to find
safety properties in C/C++ code. The tool xg++ by Ashcraft
and Engler was used to detect vulnerabilities in the Linux
Kernel [31]. The LAPSE approach by Livshits and Lam
resembles our approach in also targeting Java applications.
In contrast, we focus on interactions between applications
and specifically consider Android’s framework semantics for
our analyses, whereas LAPSE aims to detect implementation
bugs such as SQL injection and Cross-Site scripting vulner-
abilities. However, the techniques employed by the LAPSE
approach can also be used for our analyses at the source
code level instead of the backward slicing algorithm.
Some of the research prototypes have developed into com-
mercial tools such as Fortify Source Code Analyzer [32] and
Coverity Prevent [33]. Our approach is complementary to all
those works because we utilize architectural information to
focus the analysis at the code level. In addition, those tools
are designed to detect common low-level security bugs such
as buffer overflows, SQL injection and Cross-site scripting
vulnerabilities. We, however, focus on information flow anal-
ysis, and more generally aim to detect security problems
induced by software extensibility.
After the release of the Android platform, some works
have addressed the built-in application security mechanisms
of this platform [5], [34]. Moreover, Chaudhuri et al. define
a formal language to describe Android application behavior
and the application’s permission usage [35]. As discussed
above the TaintDroid approach is close to our work. Be-
yond TaintDroid, there are also other approaches with simi-
lar goals. KIRIN is an alternative application installer for
Android with a built-in security framework that enforces
policy invariants on the phone [36]. The tool checks at ap-
plication install time for issues such as unchecked interfaces.
When problems are found, the application installation is
canceled. For the analysis, KIRIN only uses the Android
Manifest file (containing the permissions) and does not look
at the program code. In addition, the interplay between dif-
ferent applications was not considered. Nauman et al. present
an Android permission framework and a policy configu-
ration user interface that allows the user to dynamically
limit application permissions at install time [37]. Similarly
to KIRIN, no inter-component relations are taken into con-
sideration for the policy enforcement and only conditions
according to time and usage count are described. On a lower
level, Shabtai et al. [38] enable the SELinux feature in the
Android kernel to explore additional protection opportuni-
ties and benchmark the system performance with activated
SELinux on a HTC G1 smartphone running Android.
Another research approach is the SAINT architecture [39].
It inserts enforcement hooks into Android’s middleware layer
to improve the currently limited Android security architec-
ture. This work takes semantics such as location and time
into account, but strictly focuses on the developer view of
permissions and does not account for transitive data flows.
IX. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this paper, we discussed how the transitivity of trust
problem affects dynamic multi-component systems. Focus-
ing on the Android platform, we presented a two-layer ap-
proach to the static security analysis of information flows
for composite Android applications and thus approached the
transitivity of trust problem in this context. On the upper
layer, we use the software architecture to slice the appli-
cations. Thereafter, the actual data flow analysis is carried
out at the AST level. The results are integrated into the
architecture to derive information flows at the architectural
layer. We demonstrated the effectiveness of our analysis
method with the help of two real-world applications, which
use advanced Java and Android programming concepts such
as inner classes, GUI handling, and Android service binding.
There are several directions for further research. First, we
aim to support a more complete set of data sources and
sinks as well as other concepts of the Android framework
such as pending intents, URI permissions, and service hooks.
Furthermore, our static analysis can be combined with dy-
namic analyses into a hybrid approach in order to improve on
the precision of the analyses. Lastly, we will analyze larger
sets of applications. For example, it would be interesting to
investigate (at least) parts of the Android market and develop
information flow policies that the applications should adhere
to.
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